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Indonesia-British Confrontation in Malaysia
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Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation 燵/size](1 of 4)
1963 saw the deployment of nuclear capable British V-bombers (Hanley Page Victor bombers) to Singapore as a deterrent to Indonesia at the beginning of the Indonesian Confrontation. Victor bombers were soon replaced by Avro Vulcan nuclear capable V-bombers.
British Vulcan (V-bombers) were never sent permanently to the Far East. Instead, four to eight were dispatched to Tengah, Singapore and RAAF Butterworth, Malaya between 1963 and 1966 during the "confrontation" between Malaysia and Indonesia. These aircraft would have been tasked, if the confrontation had escalated, with conventional bombing of Indonesian airfields to begin with. Nuclear bombs would only be used as a last resort. In addition, the Canberra squadron at Tengah began low-altitude nuclear bombing exercises at the end of 1963. This squadron remained in the Far East until 1970, although it is not clear that it necessarily remained nuclear equipped. The British government decided that any further escalation by the Indonesians would result in British Vulcan bombers conducting raids against Indonesian targets using RAAF Base Darwin as their operating base, but there is no evidence that any of the 48 nuclear bombs were moved to Darwin. During confrontation only one raid by two Victor-bombers took place against Indonesia.. But throughout the 1960s V-bombers were also sent to the Far East on SEATO nuclear reinforcement exercises.
The Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation was an intermittent war over the future of the island of Borneo, between Indonesia and British-backed Malaysia in 1962-1966. It is called "Konfrontasi" in the Indonesian and Malay languages.During the "Official" period of the confrontation, 23 serving Australians, 114 from other Commonwealth forces and an estimated 600 Indonesian servicemen died.
The following is a collection of articles and reports dealing with the countries involved in the Confrontation.
(recommended reading "Merdeka Square" by Kerry B. Collison)
Background
In 1961, the island of Borneo was divided into four separate states: Kalimantan, an Indonesian province, was located in the south of the island. In the north were the kingdom of Brunei and two British colonies: Sarawak and British North Borneo (which was later renamed Sabah). As a part of its withdrawal from its Southeast Asian colonies, the UK moved to combine its colonies on Borneo with those on peninsular Malaya, to form Malaysia.
This move was opposed by the government of Indonesia; President Sukarno argued that Malaysia was a puppet of the British, and that the consolidation of Malaysia would increase British control over the region, threatening the independence of Indonesia. Similarly, the Philippines made a claim for Sabah, arguing that it had historic links with the Philippines through the Sulu archipelago.
In Brunei, the Indonesian-backed North Kalimantan National Army (TKNU) revolted on 8th. December, 1962. They tried to capture the Sultan of Brunei, seize the oil fields and take European hostages. The Sultan escaped and asked for British help. He received British and Gurkha troops from Singapore. On December 16th., 1962, British Far Eastern Command claimed that all major rebel centers had been occupied, the rebel commander was captured and the rebellion ended.
The Philippines and Indonesia formally agreed to accept the formation of Malaysia if a majority in the disputed region voted for it in a referendum organized by the United Nations. However, before the results of the vote were reported, the Malaysian government announced that the federation would be created, depicting the decision as an internal matter, with no need for consultation. The Indonesian government saw this as a broken promise and as evidence of British imperialism.
Contrary to popular belief, no firm evidence has ever been unearthed to support claims that Sukarno had territorial ambitions over Sarawak. More likely was that Sukarno invested hopes for the establishment of a North Kalimantan state aligned to Jakartas anti-colonial/imperialist geopolitics, in which he found suitable allies.
Local opposition and sentiments against the Malaysian Federation plan has often been under-represented in historical writings on the Brunei Revolt and the subsequent Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation. In fact, political forces in Sarawak had long anticipated their own national independence as promised (but later aborted) by the last White Rajah of Sarawak, Charles Vyner Brooke, back in 1941. Left-wing and communist cell groups, which grew rapidly among Sarawaks urban Chinese communities since the 1950s (which later became the nucleus of the anti-Malaysia PARAKU and PGRS guerrilla forces), supported and propagated the unification of all British Borneo territories to form an independent leftist North Kalimantan state, an idea originally proposed by Dr. Azhari, leader of the Parti Rakyat Brunei, who had forged links with Sukarnos nationalist movement in Java since the 1940s. The North Kalimantan (or Kalimantan Utara) proposal was seen as a post-decolonization alternative by local opposition against the Malaysian Federation plan. Local opposition throughout the Borneo territories was primarily based on economic, political, historical and cultural differences between the Borneo states and the Malayan peninsula, and the refusal to be subjected under peninsular political domination.
[ Last edited by jf_pratama at 31-10-2007 10:04 AM ] |
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Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation 燵/size](2 of 4)
The War
On January 20th., 1963, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio announced that Indonesia would pursue a policy of Konfrontasi with Malaysia. On April 12th., Indonesian volunteers, allegedly Indonesian Army personnel, began to infiltrate Sarawak and Sabah, to engage in raids and sabotage, and spread propaganda. On July 27th., Sukarno declared that he was going to "crush Malaysia" or in Indonesian Malay "Ganyang Malaysia". On August 16th., troopers of the Brigade of Gurkhas clashed with fifty Indonesian guerillas.
While the Philippines did not engage in warfare, they did break off diplomatic relations with Malaysia.
The Federation of Malaysia was formally formed on September 16th., 1963. Brunei decided against joining, and Singapore separated later.
Tensions rose on both sides of the Straits of Malacca. Two days later rioters burned the British embassy in Jakarta & several hundred rioters sacked the Singapore embassy and the homes of Singaporean diplomats in Jakarta . In Malaysia, Indonesian agents were captured and crowds attacked the Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur.
Guerilla warfare
Sukarno was limited in his options for opposing Malaysia. Although equipped with modern weapons from Moscow, the Indonesian armed forces were not capable of prevailing in an open engagement with the British. Instead, Sukarno decided to encourage and support subversive movements already existing in Borneo. If allowed to develop into a major insurgency, the British might eventually be worn down into abandoning the objective of greater Malaysia altogether. By the end of 1963, this strategy increasingly involved Indonesian army regulars, posing as guerrillas, crossing the border from Kalimantan to attack the security forces in Borneo and then quickly retreating to the safety of Indonesian territory, so there was an ongoing border war; Indonesian troops and irregulars tried to occupy Sarawak and Sabah, with little success. In April the British Government gave permission for their forces to carry out raids behind enemy lines in Kalimantan and so began "Operation Claret"
In 1964, Indonesian troops began to raid areas in the Malay peninsula. In August, 16 armed Indonesian agents were captured in Johore. Activity by regular Indonesian Army over the border also increased. The British Royal Navy deployed a number of warships, including an aircraft carrier, to the area to defend Malaysia and the Royal Air Force also deployed many squadrons of aircraft. Commonwealth ground forces; 18 battalions, including elements of the Brigade of Gurkhas and three Malaysian battalions, were also committed to the conflict. The Commonwealth troops were thinly deployed and had to rely on border posts and reconnaissance by light infantry and/or the two commando units of the Royal Marines. Their main mission was to prevent further Indonesian incursions into Malaysia.
Royal Australian Navy ships attached to the BCFESR began patrol and anti insurgent duties. Minesweepers of the RAN 16th. MCM Squadron were deployed to the BCFESR for inshore patrol and minesweeping.
In July and September 1964, race riots occurred in Singapore and although thought to have been orchestrated by the Indon, eventually led to the succession of Singapore from Malaysia.
On August 17th., 1964, Indonesian paratroopers landed on the southwest coast of Johore and attempted to establish guerilla groups. On September 2nd., more paratroopers landed in Labis, Johore. On October 29th., 52 soldiers landed in Pontian on the Johore-Malacca border and were captured by New Zealand Army personnel.
When the United Nations accepted Malaysia as a nonpermanent member, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the UN and attempted to form the Conference of New Emerging Forces (Conefo) as an alternative.
In January 1965, after many Malaysian requests, Australia agreed to send troops to Borneo. Australian Army contingent included the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment and the Australian Special Air Service Regiment. There were fourteen thousand British and Commonwealth forces in Borneo by this time. According to official policy, Commonwealth troops could not follow attackers over the Indonesian border. However, units like the British Special Air Service and the Australian Special Air Service did so in secret. (The Australian government officially admitted these incursions in 1996, following the release of secret war documents governed by the 30 year secrecy act.)
On March 10th., 1965, Indonesian saboteurs carried out the MacDonald House bombing in Singapore killing 3 people and injured 33.
In mid-1965, the Indonesian government began to openly use Indonesian army forces. On June 28th., they crossed the border into eastern Sebatik Island near Tawau, Sabah, and clashed with defenders, including a frigate of the RAN which carried out jungle bombardments to harass the withdrawing Indonesians.
The end of Confrontation
Early in 1966 a group of generals lead by General Suharto came to power in Indonesia, following a coup. Due to this domestic conflict, Indonesian interest in pursuing the war with Malaysia declined, and combat eased.
On May 28th., 1966 at a conference in Bangkok, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments declared the conflict over. Violence ended in June, and a peace treaty was signed on August 11th. and ratified two days later.
End of confrontation policy
The political situation in Indonesia had dramatically changed and several attempts were made since the end of May, 1966, to start the reconciliation process. A new Government (the Gotong Royong cabinet) had been installed headed by General Suharto. On 11th., August 1966, Foreign Minister Adam Malik signed a Reconciliation agreement with the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign affairs Minister of Malaysia Tun Razak thereby ending the confrontation policy: peace came about on the 12th. August 1966, the day after the signing of the Reconciliation agreement . The agreement on the restoration of relations was the result of negotiations between Foreign Minister Adam Malik and Tun Razak in Bangkok on May 28th., 1966 that was referred to as the "Bangkok Agreement".
General Suharto in his policy statement regarding the Malaysian issue stated that the settlement of the conflict had not altered the basis and implementations of Indonesian foreign policy. It was now possible to escalate foreign policy activities towards the establishment of close and mutually beneficial co-operative relations among Southeast Asian countries.
Return to the United Nations
On 19th., September 1966, the Indonesian Ambassador to the United States L.N. Palar transmitted the following message to the Secretary General of the United Nations: "With reference to the letter of 20th., January, from the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Indonesia and to your letter of 26th., February, 1965. In answer thereto, I hereby have the honour upon instruction of my Government to inform you that my Government has decided to resume full co-operation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities starting with the twenty-first session of the General Assembly. A delegation headed by the Foreign Minister will arrive to attend the Assembly."
Statement of the President of the General Assembly.
On 22nd., September, 1966, a Delegation headed by Adam Malik a member of the Presidium for political Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs conferred with the Secretary General and reiterated the decision of the Government of Indonesia to resume full participation in the activities of the United Nations as stated in the telegram of 19th., September, 1966. The President of the General Assembly Ambassador Abdul Rahman Pazhwak recounted the background behind the Indonesian decision to withdraw from the United Nations.
The President stated that it would be assumed that it is the will of the membership that Indonesia should meet in full its budgetary obligation. �Unless I hear any objection I assume that it is the will of the membership that Indonesia would resume full activities of the Untied Nations and the Secretary General may proceed in the manner I have outlined. There being no objection, I invite the members of the Indonesian Delegation to take their seats in the General Assembly�.
Indonesian reply to the UN Assembly by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Adam Malik:
�Since the first day of this Assembly last Tuesday several representatives have referred to my countrys resumption of activities in the United Nations and have expressed their warm welcome to my Government and Delegation. Permit me Mr. President to thank you for your words of welcome and for your co-operation in smoothen the way for our return to the United Nations. I wish also to express the gratitude of my delegation for the statements of the same nature by representatives. My delegation is indeed deeply moved by their expression of confidence and looks forward with enthusiasm to co-operation and collaboration with all delegations. Finally may I thank you Mr. Secretary General for your assistance and the Secretariat for your advice and co-operation in making our reparticipation a smooth and happy one�.
Thus another dramatic episode in Indonesian history came to an end.
[ Last edited by jf_pratama at 31-10-2007 10:07 AM ] |
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Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation 燵/size](3 of 4)
British response:
The British responded to Confrontation in a two-pronged manner. In order to deter the Indonesians from mounting an open attack on Malaysia, substantial air and naval forces from Commonwealth countries in the area were deployed in and around Singapore.
Nuclear Weapons already in The Far East
Policy-makers saw a British nuclear force as an important contribution not only to NATO, but also to the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created in 1954. In 1956 a report to the Chiefs of Staff concluded that nuclear weapons would have to be used if war broke out between the SEATO powers and China, and although the Chiefs themselves were a little uncomfortable with this conclusion, planning went ahead.
A 1957 Air Ministry report found that British Valiant, Vulcan, and Victor aircraft (known as "V-bombers") carrying the Blue Danube (nuclear) bomb would be unable to reach the Far East because of short runways and limited facilities at key airfields along the route. The report recommended developing Gan, an island in the Maldives, as a staging post for bomber reinforcements, and Tengah, an existing RAF base in Singapore, as a temporary base for V-bomber squadrons.
In 1957 V-bombers began to make familiarization flights to the Far East without nuclear weapons on board, and in 1958 it was decided to construct a permanent storage facility for nuclear weapons at Tengah. By 1960 the RAF was involved in drawing up nuclear targeting plans for SEATO and had made plans to move 48 Red Beard tactical nuclear weapons to Tengah in 1962. Three squadrons of V-bombers would be based there, capable of dropping Red Beard weapons from high altitude, together with one squadron of smaller Canberra aircraft, which would use a low-altitude bombing system, or "toss bombing" tactic. In September 1960, a dummy Red Beard weapon was flown for the first time by RAF transport aircraft to Singapore, via El Adem, in Libya; Khormaksar, in present-day Yemen; and Gan. Special equipment to handle nuclear weapons had been deployed to these airfields, and also to Embakasi, Kenya, and Butterworth, a Royal Australian Air Force base in Malaya.
The political problems of moving live nuclear weapons overseas were already clear. As early as 1957 a storm was created when Minister of Defence Duncan Sandys seemed to announce, at a press conference in Australia, that nuclear weapons would be stored in Malaya and Singapore. In July 1961 Britains High Commissioner in Singapore, Lord Selkirk, advised that even the presence of dummy weapons in the Far East would be politically sensitive.
Nevertheless, on August 17, 1962, Prime Minister Macmillan authorized the RAF to deploy both live and dummy weapons to Tengah. The live weapons were to be held at all times in their special storage area, but in November 1963, permission was granted to train with dummy weapons in the open.
Militarily, the justification for these deployments was still the possibility of limited war between the SEATO powers and China. Politically, by making a nuclear contribution to SEATO, Macmillan was trying to gain a measure of influence over U.S. nuclear policy in a region where Britain and the United States had historically been at odds; he was concerned, like a number of post-war British prime ministers, by the risk of U.S. belligerence in Korea, Taiwan, or Indochina. Macmillans ministers had convinced him that British deployments, by contrast, carried no risk. But Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, although generally pro-British, was not informed. (Singapore had recently won independence from Britain as part of the Federation of Malaysia.) The British government had made a visible military commitment to SEATO, choosing to do so through the relatively inexpensive medium of a squadron of nuclear-capable aircraft, but it was coy about admitting, even privately, to the actual presence of nuclear weapons.
1963 also saw the deployment of nuclear capable British V-bombers (Hanley Page Victor bombers) to Singapore as a deterrent to Indonesia at the beginning of the Indonesian Confrontation. Victor bombers were soon replaced by Avro Vulcan nuclear capable V-bombers.
British Vulcan (V-bombers) were never sent permanently to the Far East. Instead, four to eight were dispatched to Tengah, Singapore and RAAF Butterworth, Malaya between 1963 and 1966 during the "confrontation" between Malaysia and Indonesia. These aircraft would have been tasked, if the confrontation had escalated, with conventional bombing of Indonesian airfields to begin with. Nuclear bombs would only be used as a last resort. In addition, the Canberra squadron at Tengah began low-altitude nuclear bombing exercises at the end of 1963. This squadron remained in the Far East until 1970, although it is not clear that it necessarily remained nuclear equipped. The British government decided that any further escalation by the Indonesians would result in British Vulcan bombers conducting raids against Indonesian targets using RAAF Base Darwin as their operating base, but there is no evidence that any of the 48 nuclear bombs were moved to Darwin. During confrontation only one raid by two Victor-bombers took place against Indonesia.. But throughout the 1960s V-bombers were also sent to the Far East on SEATO nuclear reinforcement exercises.
Bloodhound Missiles defend Darwin
RAAF Bloodhound surface to air missiles (SAMs) deployed to Darwin in 1964. It was not only the Indonesian hostility towards Malaysia that was of grave concern, but the Indonesian Air Force had been violating Australian airspace by overflying Darwin and penetrating well south over the mainland, all at a time when RAAF Base Tindal was under construction.
RAAF Nos 75 and 76 Squadrons were deployed to Darwin, however their Sabre aircraft were not capable of effectively intercepting the Indonesian aircraft. While the Mirage was coming, it was not yet operational and RAAF Base Darwin was vulnerable, a recognized fact in view of the proposal to move the 48 red beard nuclear weapons from Singapore to Darwin if the Indonesian Confrontation escalated
Back in 1961, RAAF No. 30 Squadron was reformed and equipped with Bloodhound Mk I surface to air missiles The Bloodhound flight envelope was more suited to short range high altitude interceptions than was the Sabre, so at some time in 1964 the decision was made to move a detachment of Bloodhounds to Darwin.
This involved a complex land, sea and air operation to transport and install the fully operational live fire surface to air missile system alongside No. 2 Control and Reporting Unit at Lee Point.
Part of the Bloodhound system was the precision illuminating radar that also had a search capability which overcame much of the shortcomings of 2CRU. The system became operational in mid-1965 and remained until the end of 1968 when Bloodhound was withdrawn from service.
Even though the political climate did improve in these years, 30 SQN was called to full operating readiness on numerous occasions, the last being only weeks before closing down. Nothing can detract from the fact that the RAAF 75 & 76 squadrons, including No. 30 SAM Squadron, were deployed to Darwin for war with Indonesia.
The Royal Navy
The Royal Navy took delivery of its first tactical nuclear weapons, Red Beards, to be carried by Scimitar aircraft on navy carriers, in 1959. Clearance for the Scimitar to take off with nuclear weapons "only in conditions of an extreme operational emergency" was received in August 1960. Although the navy originally viewed the Red Beard as a weapon for sinking ships in the North Atlantic, by the time it entered service, it seemed most likely to be used in a limited war in the Far East.
The aircraft carriers Victorious and Hermes (< photo) sailed for Singapore at the end of 1960, and for the next 10 years the operational lives of the Royal Navy carriers (including Ark Royal, photo >) revolved around deployments east of Suez, where they took their place in SEATO war planning and nuclear targeting. Arrangements were in place to embark and disembark nuclear weapons at the Singapore naval dockyard for transport to nearby RAF airfields if necessary, but the weapons appear to have been stored on board ship. The fissile components were stored away from the assemblies, and permission to join the two was never given in peacetime. When in 1963, the Indonesian Confrontation began, the British airforce and navy were already nuclear capable in the region.
Like its U.S. counterpart, the Royal Navy has always followed a "neither confirm nor deny" policy on the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on its ships. By 1966, the governments of Ceylon and New Zealand had already expressed unease at the possibility of Royal Navy ships carrying nuclear weapons into their ports. In fact, the RN had only about 25 nuclear weapons. Only five aircraft carriers, two armament stores ships, and (by the very end of the 1960s) two Tiger class anti submarine cruisers, had been equipped to carry the weapons. The only ammunition stores ships in the Far East during Confrontation specially set up to resupply the RN carriers were RFAs Retainer (A 329) and Resurgent (A 280): there is no evidence to suggest that either of these RFAs ever carried any nuclear weapons, however it is most probable that they did.
Red Beard
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Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation (4 of 4)
Red Beard was the first British tactical nuclear weapon. It was carried by the English Electric Canberra and the V bombers of the Royal Air Force, and by the Blackburn Buccaneers and Supermarine Scimitars of the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm. It entered service in 1962 and was withdrawn in 1971. Red Beard was about 4 meters (12 feet) long and weighed about 1,750 lb (794 kg). (Photo: A Red Beard tactical atomic bomb on its bomb trolley awaiting loading into a Canberra bomber.) The perforated baffles were a feature to reduce bomb bay buffetting when the Canberra bomb doors opened, and were not needed on other aircraft. Red Beard was known to the RAF as Bomb, Aircraft, HE 2000 lb MC, athough its actual weight was 1750 lb. It was deployed on a wide variety of aircraft of the RAF and Royal Navy, being stockpiled in the UK, Cyprus, Singapore and afloat on carriers.
Operation Claret
The main concern for British military planners throughout the conflict, however, was containing the insurgency in Borneo. Here the security forces were in an impossible situation. They were required to defend a frontier of approximately 1600 kilometres, in extremely dense jungle and against an enemy who could retreat to the safety of Indonesian Kalimantan. Increasingly frustrated, Major-General Sir Walter Walker, director of operations in Borneo, requested permission to pursue the guerrillas across the border. After considerable debate, London finally agreed in April 1964.
The objective of cross-border operations, code-named "Claret", was to wrest the initiative from the enemy. Accordingly, starting in May that year, predominantly SAS troops, British Special Air Service and Australian Special Air Service, operating in groups of four, regularly patrolled territory immediately across the border. When a patrol discovered enemy guerrillas moving towards Borneo, it would arrange for them to be ambushed as they crossed the border.
The patrols went up to 10 miles into Kalimantan, to detect Indonesian forces about to enter Sarawak. Conventional Commonwealth troops were then directed into position to ambush the invaders as they crossed the border.
The fact that nothing was know about these "Claret" operations until 1996, speaks volumes for the integrity of the soldiers of the time as operations were graded "top secret".
These operations were a violation of official and international treaties; although the incursions were initially denied, both the British and the Australian governments admitted the attacks in 1996. As we have seen, the Australian Government treated the Australian people with contempt by misleading them over operations and its own role during the Indonesian Confrontation.( See: Sukano, the Coup of 1965 and the Australian Involvement.)
Britain requests support
This strategy, both regarding deterrence and military operations, was remarkably successful in containing the insurgency to a low level of conflict. Nonetheless, it required a considerable deployment of Britains limited resources and manpower. By early 1965, for example, Britain had more than 60,000 servicemen deployed in the region, together with a surface fleet of more than eighty warships, including two aircraft-carriers. It was not surprising, therefore, that, starting in December 1963, repeated requests were made by the British for Australia and New Zealand to send combat forces into Borneo to assist in containing the insurgency. Australian Special Air Service forces had been deployed in secret to Borneo and Australia initially refused to "officially" send troops to Malaysia until January 1965 when HMAS Sydney now converted to a fast troop transport, carried troops and equipment to Jesselton in North Borneo. There were already Australian & New Zealand forces in place in Malaysia as part of an ongoing commitment to the BCFESR.
New Zealand refuses to send troops
In responding to these requests the National administration in NZ led by K.J. Holyoake had to weigh carefully certain countervailing policy considerations. On the one hand, there was no disagreement that Malaysia should be supported. In both official and public eyes, Indonesia had committed clear and frequent acts of aggression against the new state. On the other hand, however, Wellington was eager to avoid New Zealand becoming embroiled in a major war with Indonesia. Policy-makers realised that, in the event of considerable bloodshed, New Zealands relations with its closest Asian neighbour could be poisoned for generations to come. Consequently, the government initially refused to send troops into Borneo, arguing that British and Malaysian forces already stationed there were sufficient to deal with the problem.
NZ drawn in by Malay peninsula attack
Deeply frustrated by the failure of Confrontation to make any real headway, Sukarno decided in mid 1964 to intensify it by extending military operations to the Malay peninsula. On 1 September, ninety-eight Indonesian paratroopers landed just north of Labis in Johore. One of the few available Commonwealth units in the area was 1st Battalion, RNZIR, which, with Wellingtons permission, was used to hunt down the infiltrators, most of whom surrendered without a struggle. Later, on 29 October, the New Zealanders were involved in a similar operation to capture a small amphibious force which had landed at the mouth of the Sungei Kesang River north-west of Muar. In addition to these activities, the RNZAFs 14 Squadron, consisting of six Canberra bombers, was deployed to Singapore, where it remained as part of the Commonwealths air power deterrent until the end of Confrontation.
Holyoake agrees to send limited force
Sukarno responded to these failures by substantially increasing the flow of insurgents crossing the border into Borneo. With Britains military resources stretched to almost breaking point, the New Zealand government believed it could no longer decline the genuine appeals for assistance coming from London. On 1 February 1965 the Prime Minister announced that a small Special Air Service detachment, together with the 1RNZIR, would be deployed in Borneo as soon as possible. In addition, New Zealand crews would man two former Royal Navy minesweepers, renamed HMNZS Hickleton and Santon, which would join the new Type 12 frigate HMNZS Taranaki in patrolling Malaysian waters around the Malacca Strait.
During late February the 1st Ranger Squadron NZSAS, comprising about forty men under the command of Major W.J.D. Meldrum, began its tour of duty. They were replaced by a similarly sized detachment, commanded by Major R.S. Dearing, in October the same year. Both detachments took part in Claret operations alongside Britains 22nd Regiment SAS. 1RNZIR, commanded by Colonel R.M. Gurr, was not deployed in Borneo until May 1965, when it relieved a Gurkha battalion in Sarawak. In a series of skirmishes, it inflicted substantial losses on the enemy without suffering any fatal casualties. Relieved during October, 1RNZIR returned to its base in Malaya. By the time it was redeployed to Borneo in May 1966, Confrontation had all but ended.
Source: http://www.kerrycollison.net/index.php?/ar...d.html#extended
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bro xde gamba ke utk thread nie? klu ade gamba lagi seronok baca sejarah nie |
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REFLEKSI 45 TAHUN KOPASKA
03 Apr 2007
OLEH : LETKOL LAUT (E) M FAISAL
Pada saat terbentuknya Pasukan Katak pada 31 Maret 1962,saat itu hanya dibekali dengan peralatan minim teknologi, dengan jumlah personel terbatas. Padahal, tugas yang harus diemban amat berat.
Dalam merebut kembali Irian Barat dari Belanda pada 1961,Indonesia melalui Komando Tertinggi (Koti), membentuk operasi Mandala (Trikora). Tugasnya merebut kembali Irian Barat dari Belanda. Lalu, Armada RI menyiapkan pasukan berani mati, dengan tugas pokok menghancurkan pangkalan Angkatan Laut Belanda di Biak, dan menenggelamkan kapal Karl Dorman.
Lalu, muncullah nama Kolonel Laut OP Koesno sebagai komandan Kopaska TNI AL pertama, Mayor Laut Oerip Santoso,dan Sertu PDD Emil Yoseph sebagai pelatih. Selanjutnya, akhir Januari 1962, Mabesal membentuk instruktur grup, dengan memanggil personil TNI AL dari korps jasmani, berpangkat pama hingga tamtama sebanyak 17 orang.Awal Februari dimulailah latihan fisik, yang mengambil tempat di Hotel Thamrin Jakarta.
Latihan ini bersifat tertutup identitasnya. Puncaknya, pada 31 Maret 1962, di halaman kolam renang Senayan Jakarta, Panglima Angkatan Laut (Pangal), Laksamana Madya RE Martadinata meresmikan berdirinya satuan Pasukan Katak AL, yang kemudian dikenal dengan Kopaska. Mengingat pasukan ini harus sudah siap pada Juli 1962, Dansat Kopaska pertama memutuskan untuk mengambil personel dari satuan yang memiliki kualifikasi komando.
Namun ditolak Mabes KKO, dengan alasan Kipam akan menjalankan operasi sendiri, untuk mendukung operasi amfibi pada Operasi Mandala Trikora. Solusinya, atas perintah Danjen RPKAD Mayjen Pahardimulyo, dikirimlah 75 personel berpangkat prajurit kader hingga mayor.Setelah tes, tersaring 22 personel. Jumlah ini ditambah dari Kodam Jaya sebanyak tiga orang. Setelah latihan di Pulau Edam- Kepulauan Seribu selama dua bulan, sekitar awal Juni 1962, satuan RPKAD sebanyak 21 personel, menyatakan tidak sanggup, dan mengundurkan diri.
Mereka juga minta dikembalikan ke Cijantung.Tapi atas perintah Ketua G-1 Koti, pada Komandan Kol OP Koesno, latihan terus berlanjut, hingga keberangkatan ke daerah operasi Trikora. Namun, tempat latihan pun dipindah ke Pangkalan Armada RI Ujung Surabaya. Materi latihannya meliputi keluar masuk kapal selam, melaksanakan problem decompressi chamber, serta naik-turun jaring kapal.
Hingga akhirnya, mereka diberangkatkan dengan KRI Sam Ratulangi. Pada pertengahan Agustus 1962, Kopaska AL dikembalikan dari daerah operasi Mandala Trikora, akibat perjanjian damai antara Belanda dan RI. Selanjutnya,personel dari RPKAD yang berjumlah 21 personel dikembalikan ke Cijantung, sedangkan tiga dari Kodam Jaya disalurkan ke Kodikal, untuk kemudian dididik jadi Catam TNI AL. Untuk kelangsungan masa depan Kopaska AL, pada Agustus 1962 dilakukan penerimaan calon siswa Kopaska AL.
Mereka ditempa di Batujajar. Pada medio 1963, atas perintah Komando Tertinggi (Koti), Kopaska AL melakukan persiapan pelaksanaan operasi Dwikora.Tugasnya mengganyang pemerintah Malaysia,pimpinan Tengku Abdurahman. Yang meliputi daratan Malaka, Singapura, Serawak, dan Sabah (waktu itu masih tergabung dengan Malaysia). Operasi dimulai pada 15 Maret 1964. Seluruh anggota tim Kopaska, yang melaksanakan operasi Dwikora, mendapat penjelasan dari Komandan Kopaska bahwa secara administrasi telah dikeluarkan dari dinas Angkatan Laut.
Pasalnya, jika ada personel yang tertangkap musuh, maka Angkatan Laut dapat mengelak keterlibatannya. Tim Kopaska sebanyak 14 orang termasuk empat orang anggota Kipam KKO yang dipimpin Serda PDD Sunandar dengan berbekal pengetahuan sekuriti singkat berhasil masuk ke daerah sasaran di Singapura. Mereka bermaksud melakukan peledakan memakai jam tangan di daerah perkotaan Singapura dan Pelabuhan Port Dickson, namun sayang ada sedikit masalah,sehingga tidak dapat terlaksana.
Peledakan berikutnya,dilakukan mengarah jaringan pipa air minum di daerah Bukit Timah,yang membentang dari Johor menuju Naval Air Force Seato di Changi, dengan bahan peledak TNT seberat 10 kg. Sasaran berikutnya, kilang minyak Pulau Sebarok,dengan TNT 10 kg, namun tangki tidak terbakar, karena dilapisi genangan air pada sekeliling tangki penyimpanan. Hingga Agustus 1964, di daerah operasi Singapura, bahan peledak sebanyak 40 kg sudah habis.
Komandan Basis di Singapura,mendapat tugas intelijen guna perihal data-data, tentang kegiatan tentara Diraja Malaysia, sekaligus mendeteksi kapal Seato, yang terbukti keluar-masuk pangkalan AL Sembawang. Pada November 1964, seluruh tim Kopaska ditarik dari daerah operasi di Singapura, dan kembali ke daerah persiapan awal di Jakarta.
Putusan ini diambil dengan pertimbangan pelaksanaan operasi tidak efektif lagi. Setelah masa operasi Dwikora atau sekitar September 1964, markas Kopaska AL dipindahkan dari kompleks Seskoal Cipulir ke bangunan mes di bawah Denma Mabesal, di Jln Radio Dalam, Jakarta Selatan. Semua biaya pembangunan berasal dari Koti. Pada Desember 1964, selama lima bulan, Kopaska AL mendapat perintah untuk menyusup ke daerah Timor Timur, melalui Atambua. Tugas utamanya, menggalang penduduk setempat,untuk melakukan pemberontakan melawan Portugis.
Dalam operasi itu, Kopaska AL mengirimkan satu tim, pimpinan Serda PDD Suwarno dan Kelasi Sutas. Penyusupan dilakukan dengan cara tersamar, dengan menyamar sebagai pedagang kuda. Kemudian, saat pecahnya G30 S/PKI, satuan Kopaska yang telah memiliki markas baru ini, dalam kondisi siaga menunggu perintah dari Komandan Kopaska AL Kolonel OP Koesno. Selanjutnya, pada hari yang sama, pukul 19.30, Komandan jaga, Sertu PDD Sunandar menerima telepon dari Perwira Dinas Mabesal, perihal kesiapan pasukan Kopaska untuk membantu pasukan Kostrad, menuju daerah penyiksaan Lubang Buaya Jakarta Timur.
Namun karena belum mendapat perintah Mabesal maupun Koti, pasukan ini memilih menunggu perintah lebih lanjut. Pada 8 Oktober 1965, setelah operasi penyelamatan jenazah para perwira tinggi TNI AD, baru diketahui jika kurir Padin Mabesal, yang membawa perintah untuk Kopaska,keliru menyampaikan ke satuan Kipam KKO di Cilandak, Jakarta Selatan. Menurut kurir tersebut, Kopaska adalah Kipam yang sama-sama berseragam hijau.
Setelah diteliti, dalam operasi penyelamatan tersebut, di samping anggota Kipam terdapat dua orang dari RPKAD, yaitu Prader Sangaji dan Prader Umar,yang mengaku sebagai anggota Kopaska. Ini tidak salah juga, karena mereka berdua tergabung dalam pasukan berani mati, yang pernah bertugas pada masa Trikora 1962 lalu, dalam satuan tugas Kopaska. Itulah beberapa sejarah singkat perjuangan Kopaska.
Selain itu, masih banyak tugas lain, di antaranya penyitaan 11 karung dokumen penting. Dokumen tersebut berisi data-data penting, tentang siapa-siapa yang terlibat pada gerakan G 30 S/ PKI. Hal ini, membuat bangga Kolonel Sarwo Eddy, yang tak lain merupakan pelatih Komando di Batujajar. Prestasi lainnya, yaitu membantu Komandan Operasi Ikan Paus, yang dipimpin Brigjen KKO Boy Abidin. Operasi ini dalam rangka menggagalkan logistik sebanyak 17 truk ke Blitar Selatan.
Kondisi Saat Ini
Kehidupan, operasi, dan kegiatan Kopaska terus berlanjut. Saat ini, permasalahan yang dihadapi Pasukan Katak, masih sama seperti 45 tahun yang lalu, di mana sistem persenjataan yang belum memadai bagi pasukan khusus, yang sedianya membutu*kan peralatan yang khusus pula. Karena keadaan yang demikian, Pasukan Katak harus mengembangkan diri dan tidak boleh menyerah dengan keadaan negara yang sedang sulit.
Hal ini pun sesuai dengan semboyan yang dimiliki Kopaska,yaitu �?Tan Hana Wigna Tan Sirna�?. Semboyan ini berarti tidak ada rintangan yang tidak bisa di lewati. Pasukan Katak pun mengembangkan sendiri sistem persenjataan, yang disesuaikan dengan matra dan medan tugas yang harus dihadapi. Salah satu contoh persenjataan itu adalah Kendaraan Tempur Bawah Air (KTBA). Merupakan hasil pemikiran dari prajurit-prajurit terbaik dari Kopaska, serta didukung penuh oleh TNI AL.
KTBA diciptakan untuk menunjang dan mengunggulkan kemampuan prajurit Pasukan Katak dalam menguasai medan tempur bawah air, agar mampu menyusup ke wilayah laut lawan, dan menghancurkan sarana vital yang dimiliki musuh, serta dengan sigap, dan sesegera mungkin kembali ke daerah sendiri yang lebih aman. Seperti yang berkembang saat ini, operasi-operasi yang dilakukan pasukan khusus tidak lagi dapat dilaksanakan sendiri-sendiri. Maka, operasi gabungan pasukan khusus mutlak dibutu*kan, untuk menghadapi lawan yang memiliki kemampuan yang semakin kompleks, dan yang berdimensi multikonvensional.
Perang nonkonvensional dan asimetris merupakan bentuk konflik pada masa mendatang yang tidak dapat dihindari lagi. Hanya pasukan yang memiliki kemampuan dan kualifikasi khusus,dan terlatih yang mampu mengatasinya. Selanjutnya, hanya negara-negara yang menyadari dan menyikapinya dengan serius yang mampu bertahan untuk menghadapi ancaman ini. Fakta yang ada membuktikan bahwa semakin besar kekuatan militer dari suatu negara,maka semakin disegani negara tersebut,baik oleh negara-negara tetangga maupun negara jauh.
Hal ini akan membuat negara kita akan semakin stabil dan akan mempengaruhi sektor ekonomi negara ke arah yang lebih baik, yang secara tidak langsung akan berimbas pada kesejahteraan rakyat dan bangsa Indonesia. Dengan menimbang hal-hal tersebut, Kopaska pada kesempatan hari ulang tahun ini, berharap agar latihan operasi gabungan, dapat dilaksanakan secara berkesinambungan, di mana nantinya dapat menjadi suatu acuan TNI, dalam menghadapi ancaman yang akan datang, pada masa mendatang. Sebab, untuk membangun negara ini, kita harus mengesampingkan ego atau kesombongan diri kita masing-masing, dan bersama dalam mengatasi segala bentuk ancaman, baik dari dalam maupun dari luar.
Sources : http://www.tni.mil.id/
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In 1964, Indonesian troops began to raid areas in the Malay peninsula. In August, 16 armed Indonesian agents were captured in Johore
tujuan kenape askar indonesia landing kat johor sbb kawasan yang diorang nak landing tu byk orang jawa and mereka ingat orang-orang kampung ni akan bantu mereka..tetapi sebaliknya yang berlaku.. di mana bumi dipijak,di situ langit dijunjung:cool: |
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Aku baca buku sejarah, Indo Army yang kena tembak ngan peluru hidup tak berdarah pun... cuma terdapat kesan hitam pada badannya. Pakai tangkal ape, ek? |
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Reply #8 sinalegna's post
membe aku bapak dia polis zaman konfrontasi dulu.. dia cerita ade satu peristiwa di mana polis ambush askar2 indon ni.. ade seorang askar indon semacam tak lut peluru..bapak member aku tu tembak dia kat dada banyak kali gune machice gun (or submachine gun) banyak kali tak mati2.. polis campak grenade kat dia, dia boleh campak grenade tu kat polis balik.. kira bersaling campak-campakan la (pelik gak grenade tu meletop lepas 2 kali campak ).. tapi indon tu mati akhirnya..bukan sebabkan ditembusi peluru..tapi rusuk/tulang dada dia remuk sbb kene tembak byk kali kat area tu.. Peluru tak lut, tapi impak peluru pada dada dia yang kasi kesan..
Korang rasa boleh dipercayai ke? |
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Reply #9 dCrook's post
entah..
tapi macam tak boleh dipercayai |
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Reply #9 dCrook's post
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tu la pasal.. buku sejarah tu cakap indo army tu mati sebab kena jerangkap samar & jatuh.. tapi kena tembak tak berdarah, anggota badan masih sempurna luka pun macam cedera ringgan je kesan pada badan dia... |
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Reply #11 sinalegna's post
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Cam x caya jea... Mgarut ler... Xde yg kebal, kalo betul2 diorg kebal nape Belanda bole mjajah Indo smpi bratus tahun lama nyer... |
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Reply #12 yaminz's post
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maybe diorang ni tak kisah dijajah bangsa asing, tapi pantang di tunduk pada kejayaan rumpun bangsa sendiri... |
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aku fikir macam tu jugak... semangat kepuakan kuat sangat... |
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Reply #14 HangPC2's post
sama la macam orang-orang malaysia zaman dulu pon (skang pon same gak) semangat kenegerian masing-masing punya la kuat sampai satu negeri perang dengan negeri lain.. dah namanya politik..
kat indonesia lak tak salah aku masa perang aceh, askar2 belanda terdiri dari orang batak ngan jawa.. |
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Originally posted by sinalegna at 23-2-2008 10:38 AM
maybe diorang ni tak kisah dijajah bangsa asing, tapi pantang di tunduk pada kejayaan rumpun bangsa sendiri...
Originally posted by HangPC2 at 23-2-2008 11:14 AM
aku fikir macam tu jugak... semangat kepuakan kuat sangat...
Rumpun bangsa Melayu dijajah kerana kita tidak bersatu...
Andai kata sekiranya pada zaman dahulu ada seorang 'Yang Terpilih' (The Chosen One) muncul dan menyatu-padukan seluruh penduduk Nusantara, pasti keadaan sekarang adalah berbeza...
Tiada negara yang namanya Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapura, Filipina dan Timor Leste. Yang ada hanya sebuah negara yang sangat luas dimana penduduknya bersatu-padu...
Walau bagaimanapun, itu cuma impian yang tidak mungkin menjadi kenyataan. Apa yang penting sekarang ialah kita perlu belajar dari kesilapan lampau.... 
[ Last edited by ijad_adiputera at 24-2-2008 06:13 AM ] |
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Originally posted by jf_pratama at 31-10-2007 10:47 AM 
In Brunei, the Indonesian-backed North Kalimantan National Army (TKNU) revolted on 8th. December, 1962. They tried to capture the Sultan of Brunei, seize the oil fields and take European hostages. The Sultan escaped and asked for British help. He received British and Gurkha troops from Singapore. On December 16th., 1962, British Far Eastern Command claimed that all major rebel centers had been occupied, the rebel commander was captured and the rebellion ended.
Apa yang menghairankan aku ialah rakyat Brunei TIDAK pernah meminta pertolongan dari TKNU. Jika benar TKNU mahu menolong Brunei, mengapa Sultan Brunei perlu ditangkap?
Jawapan sebenar: Sultan Brunei menyokong rancangan pembentukan negara 'Malaysia' dan bersetuju untuk memasukkan Brunei ke dalam 'Malaysia'. Pada fikiran Sukarno, tindakan Sultan Brunei ini akan menghancurkan pembentukan negara impiannya - 'Indonesia Raya'...
:re::re:
[ Last edited by ijad_adiputera at 24-2-2008 05:17 AM ] |
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Originally posted by jf_pratama at 31-10-200710:47 AM
More likely was that Sukarno invested hopes for the establishment of a North Kalimantan state aligned to Jakartas anti-colonial/imperialist geopolitics, in which he found suitable allies.
Tiada nama "North Kalimantan state" di dalam catatan sejarah. Hanya ada nama "North Borneo Federation" atau 'Persekutuan Borneo Utara' (satu gagasan yang diperjuangkan oleh A.M Azhari, ketua Parti Rakyat Brunei yang mahu menubuhkan sebuah negara merdeka yang merangkumi Brunei, Sabah dan Sarawak).
Dari mana munculnya nama "North Kalimantan state" ini? Mengapa 慘alimantan |
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Post time 31-10-2007 10:47 AM
变色卡
Author
Post time 22-2-2008 08:37 AM
