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Israeli Military Hardware (ex- Israeli Armour)
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From Jane's:
Quote:
Key Points:
* The IDF has encountered a wide array of ATGMs since its incursion into south Lebanon, including the Kornet-E 9P133, Metis-M 9M131, the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 'Spandrel') and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot')
* More than 20 IDF personnel have been killed by ATGMs since the start of the conflict
An arsenal of advanced Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) is emerging as the most effective weapon being deployed by the Islamic Resistance's (the military wing of the Lebanese Shi'ite Party of God - Hizbullah) against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.
"It is the most extensive encounter between Israeli armour and Russian-made ATGMs since the October 1973 war," retired brigadier general Avigdor Klein, a recent chief armour officer in the Israel Defence Force (IDF), told Jane's.
The IDF has encountered a wide array of ATGMs since its incursion into south Lebanon.
These include the Kornet-E 9P133, claimed to be able to penetrate 1-1.2 m of armour protected by explosive reactive armour (ERA); the Metis-M 9M131, equipped with a tandem high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) warhead; the 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel) and the 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 'Spigot') ATGMs.
"This massive supply of ATGMs reaffirms our concerns that advanced Russian weapons sold to Syria were forwarded to Hizbullah," a senior Israeli defence source told Jane's. Iran manufactures its own version of the Konkurs, the Towsan-1/M113 and has also developed improved versions of the 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 'Sagger') under the local name of Raad, both of which have surfaced with Hizbullah in Lebanon.
During the first month of fighting, 13 IDF armour personnel were killed by ATGM hits on Israel's most protected main battle tanks (MBTs); the Merkava Mk 2, 3, and 4.
"To put it in perspective," said a senior IDF source, "out of more than 500 ATGMs fired at us in the first month of fighting, only some 40 tanks sustained hits, with 10 being penetrated."
IDF commanders defined the Russian ATGMs as their "most dangerous challenge" in the fighting. "We are paying a heavy price to the ATGMs," admitted Major General Udi Adam, head of the IDF's Northern Command.
Several senior IDF sources have expressed disappointment in the IDF's decision to defer the procurement of Rafael Armament Development Authority's Trophy armour protection system (APS), which they believe could have turned the odds in the fighting.
"When we designed the Merkava Mk 4, we realised that the ERA is not sufficient to protect from advanced Russian ATGMs and that's why the Mk 4 was designed to carry an APS," said Klein, who is currently employed by Rafael.
"The Mk 4 provides excellent protection from all missiles in most of the tank's sectors, but some sectors are vulnerable to the advanced missiles. "An APS such as the Trophy could have defeated all ATGM threats," claimed another defence source. "Moreover, it would have required the designers of ATGMs to develop a whole new concept for anti-tank missiles."
IDF field commanders echo these claims. "The decision not to acquire an APS was simply a matter of wrong priorities. It could have completely changed the pace of our advancement in Lebanon and save lives," said Gen Adam.
"Nonetheless, if it wasn't for the high level of protection inherent in the Merkava design, the results could have been worse. You have to recognise how many lives the Merkavas' armour have saved."
While Hizbullah anti-tank teams appear well-trained and familiar with the MBTs weak spots, some of their successful hits are attributed to the tactics employed by the IDF in the first weeks of the fighting.
"Most of the armoured units were deployed on rescue and covering missions, rather than leading a wide offensive," said Klein. "This is contradictory to the IDF armour doctrine and unnecessarily exposed the tanks to the missiles.
"The small formations used to take over the small south Lebanese villages were unsuited for the threat," he added. "Employing the right tactics could significantly reduce the number of tanks hit.
"We were attacked by hundreds of ATGMs," Colonel Amnon Asulin, commander of the IDF's Sa'ar Armoured Brigade 7, told Jane's.
"These were young troops who were sent there, inexperienced in that kind of warfare, but as they are gaining experience and become familiar with the terrain they also adapt and improve their tactics."
"We were amazed by the vast quantity of weapons that we've discovered and encountered in Lebanon," said Gen Adam, "but we are becoming more efficient at dealing with them."
In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israeli armour was surprised by the quantity and efficiency of Egyptian and Syrian anti-tank teams, equipped with Russian-made Sagger ATGMs, which caused severe damage to hundreds of tanks.
"Hizbullah is not the same kind of surprise," said Gen Adam. "It only requires some adaptation from us."
At the same time, Israel is launching a diplomatic effort to stop Russian arms sales to Syria. "For years, we have been warning the Russians that their weapons would end up in the hands of Hizbullah, while they claimed to be selling arms only to responsible states," a senior diplomatic source told Jane's. "This has clearly proved to be false."
http://www.militaryphotos.net/fo ... ?t=88852&page=4 |
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Well, at least it shows that Russian-built weapons aren't really crap, are they? |
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Meet the objective to give the adversaries a bloody nose..... |
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Reply #52 gancity's post
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Arrogant & over confident is their downfall..... Lesson to learn : never underestimate your enemy |
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Commander: Not many tanks harmed during war
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3296462,00.html
Commander of 401 Armored Corps Brigade, Colonel Moti Kidor: 'During war hundreds of antitank missiles fired, 18 damaged'
Hanan Greenberg Published: 08.28.06, 00:07
As the war continued in the north, more and more tanks were damaged. Many voices were heard in the past declaring the Merkava MK 4 model as "the safest in the world," but it turned out that many of these tanks were damaged by Hizbullah antitank missiles, causing the IDF a significant number of losses.
Colonel Moti Kidor, Commander of the 401 Armored Corps Brigade, however, says that "those who ask these questions simply don't understand the field, and unfortunately these include senior IDF officers. When you look at the full picture, one understands that during the war hundreds of antitank missiles were fired, and in total 18 tanks were damaged. Of those, missiles penetrated only five or six. To my sorrow, eight soldiers were killed in these incidents."
He added: "Like every tank in the past and in the future, the Merkava MK 4 is vulnerable. It's basically like asking why a chopper fell.If you strike it, it falls. I don't think there is any surprise here, and whoever is surprised simply doesn't understand. It's true that eight soldiers were killed in tanks, and that every soldier is a world in himself, but in relation to the number of missiles fired at us |
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I think I'll Matadors can do better than those RPGs in penetrating reactive armour.
Reactive armour is useless actually.
I see the wisdom of SAF not to reply on heavy tanks now but on speed instead. |
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Sep. 3, 2006 23:28 | Updated Sep. 4, 2006 9:33
Post-battle probe finds Merkava tank misused in Lebanon
By YAAKOV KATZ
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Sat ... PArticle%2FShowFull
On July 12, just a few minutes after Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser were abducted in a cross-border Hizbullah attack, the IDF Northern Command issued the infamous Hannibal Directive, standard procedure in the event an IDF soldier is abducted.
Receiving the order on the ground near Moshav Zarit - scene of the kidnapping attack - was Battalion 82 of Armored Brigade 7. Led by Lt.-Col. Moti Basayuk, the unit was ordered to chase the kidnappers. Capt. Elad, commander of Company A, was given the directive and dispatched a Merkava 2 tank into Lebanon, for the first time since the IDF withdrawal in 2000. But after traveling just 50 meters, the tank drove over a massive explosive device buried underground that exploded, destroying it and killing its four crew members.
After that initial foray, the IDF sent another 400 tanks into Lebanon to participate in the fighting against Hizbullah. Tanks assisted soldiers from the Golani Brigade during the fierce fighting in Bint Jbail and surrounded the villages of Maroun A-Ras and Ayta A-Shayeb. They were also used during the IDF's last-minute push to the Litani River on August 11, hours before the United Nations Security Council approved a cease-fire.
At the height of the war, commanders hailed what they were calling the "successful integration" of tanks in the warfare and fighting against Hizbullah. But now that the dust has settled and the tanks have departed Lebanon, the military has been busy investigating the integration of these armored vehicles, with some officers already concluding that the military acted "negligently and irresponsibly" in its use of the tanks during the war.
From testimony collected in preparation for the commissions of inquiry set up to investigate the war, the Armored Corps has put together an ominous picture regarding the use of the Merkava tanks. Said to be the "best-protected" tank in the world, the Merkava featured prominently during the war. In total, out of the 400 tanks in Lebanon, close to 50 were hit by the thousands of anti-tank Hizbullah missiles, and 22 were penetrated, leaving close to 30 crew members dead.
According to one of the officers involved in the investigations, the Merkava tanks' protective elements were effective, and had the tanks been used correctly, the number of casualties would have been drastically reduced.
One example the officer gave was the tank's ability to create smokescreens to hide from enemy sights. "There are many different systems on the tank that were just not used," the high-ranking officer told The Jerusalem Post. "The tanks' outer shield proved to be effective in stopping many of the missiles but there were many other systems aboard the tanks that were not used and for no clear reason."
According to the officer, even during the Battle of the Saluki, when 24 tanks from Brigade 401 were stuck in a valley under heavy Hizbullah anti-tank missile fire, the commanders failed to utilize the smokescreen system.
One of the reasons behind the tank crew's failures to properly operate the armored vehicles in Lebanon was their commanders' relatively little amount of hands-on tank training. "All of the brigades have spent the past year operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and mostly without tanks," he said. "They were not trained in advance of the war in preparation for the fighting in the Lebanese terrain."
As a lesson of the war, the IDF is now interested in purchasing active-protection systems for the tanks similar to the Rafael-manufactured Trophy system or the Israeli Military Industries Iron Fist system, and is even asking the Treasury for a supplement to the defense budget that would fund the project, valued at hundreds of millions of shekels.
"First the tanks need to be used effectively during the war and not negligently like they were," the officer said. "Once the commanders start to use the machines the way they are meant to be used we will be able to add on the active-protection system which will also defend them incoming anti-tank missiles." |
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Aug. 15, 2006 23:11
Tank hits not as bad as it seemed
By YAAKOV KATZ
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Sat ... p;cid=1154525881698
With 40 damaged tanks and 30 tank crew members killed in fighting in Lebanon, the Armored Corps began Monday to gear up for its next battle - this coming October when it tries convincing high-school graduates to enlist in its ranks.
Thousands of antitank missiles were fired over the days of fighting at tanks and infantry forces in southern Lebanon. But while soldiers told stories of deadly missile attacks on tanks, OC Armored Corps Brig.-Gen. Halutsi Rudoy revealed Tuesday that out of the almost 400 tanks that operated in Lebanon, only a few dozen were hit by antitank missiles and only 20 were actually penetrated.
"The fighting was fierce and they fired hundreds and possibly thousands of missiles," he told The Jerusalem Post in his first interview since a cease-fire went into effect. "But if I compare the number of casualties in this war to the first Lebanon War in 1982 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973; then there were thousands killed in tanks and here only 30."
Rudoy said the antitank missiles soldiers confronted in Lebanon were some of the most advanced in the world. He said Hizbullah had thousands of Soviet-built Sagger, Cornet and Fagot antitank missiles, the French MILAN and the US-built TOW, all supplied by Iran and Syria. These missiles are usually fired by a two- or three-man team, the IDF has said.
But the missiles are not only used against tanks, despite their official title. Aware that in close-range combat the IDF has an advantage, Hizbullah fighters set up positions kilometers away from Israeli forces and also used antitank missiles against infantry forces. More than 70 infantry soldiers were killed in antitank missile attacks on the homes they had commandeered in Lebanese villages and as they moved throughout the hilly terrain.
Rudoy said it was possible new recruits might be scared to enlist in the Armored Corps, but he believed that when they were told the real numbers and how tanks were responsible for killing dozens of Hizbullah fighters they would come and serve.
"We were at war, and in war the soldiers and the tanks at the front are the ones that get hit the most," Rudoy said. "It could have been worse, and thanks to the high professional level of the tank crews, the damage was far less than what was expected in the beginning."
Referring to the Trophy, a Rafael-developed active protection system that creates a hemispheric protected zone around armored vehicles such as the Merkava 4 tank, Rudoy said he would demand that his tanks be fitted with the defense system once it was deemed operational. |
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Aug. 29, 2006 22:52 | Updated Aug. 30, 2006 15:50
Wadi Saluki battle - microcosm of war's mistakes
By YAAKOV KATZ
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Sat ... PArticle%2FShowFull
The battle of Wadi Saluki will be remembered as one of the fiercest fights of the second Lebanon War.
It was during the push to the Litani River - a few hours before the UN-brokered cease-fire went into effect - that a column of Merkava tanks from Brigade 401 began crossing Wadi Saluki in the face of fierce Hizbullah resistance.
Friday night, August 11, was a turning point in the war. The cease-fire resolution was approved by the UN Security Council, and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz ordered the IDF to take control of Lebanon up to the Litani River, the area from which Hizbullah had fired most of its Katyusha rockets.
Crossing the Saluki meant the troops and tanks had to climb a steep hill while exposed to attack from mountains on every side. Understanding the risk to his tanks, Brig.-Gen. Guy Zur, commander of Division 162, deployed Nahal Brigade infantrymen on the high ground outside Andouriya and Farun, to provide cover for the armored column below.
The wadi was described later by senior officers from Division 162 as the "gateway to the Litani." Crossing it was deemed to be the first, essential step in a sweep west across southern Lebanon.
Commanded by Col. Moti Kidor, Brigade 401's Merkava tanks had been waiting for the push to the Litani for close to a week. Twice, they had received the word to go, but when they began rolling, they were immediately told to stop. But on August 11, just before 5 p.m., orders came that were not canceled and at 8 p.m. the tanks began to move.
The Hizbullah fighters were waiting. Kidor's men had been standing by for nearly a week and the enemy knew that the only way west ran through the Saluki. At least 100 guerrillas had deployed with their most advanced anti-tank missile - the Russian-made Cornet.
By early morning on August 13, 24 hours before the cease-fire was scheduled to go into effect, the soldiers succeeded in crossing the wadi and climbing the hill, at a heavy price. Twelve soldiers were killed - eight tankists and four infantrymen. Some 80 Hizbullah gunmen were killed.
Then orders came to halt the advance, leaving Kidor and his men wondering why they had been sent in the first place. Why were they ordered to cross the Saluki when it was clear that the cease-fire would be approved? What did these 12 soldiers die for?
The Battle of the Saluki was a microcosm of all the mistakes that were made during the war in Lebanon. Soldiers waited for a week, like sitting ducks, for orders that were twice received and twice canceled, reflecting a total lack of clarity and confidence within the General Staff, and perhaps the political echelon.
When the orders finally came, they made no sense; why push to the Litani hours before the UN was set to approve a cease-fire? What was the point of the brief, bloody operation, the soldiers asked, especially given the fact that two days after crossing the Saluki, they crossed it again - this time heading home?
Senior officers criticized the operation this week, saying it was launched at the last minute in an effort to influence public opinion in Israel and in Lebanon ahead of the UN Security Council vote on the cease-fire resolution. "The army wanted to show that it could conquer ground," one officer said. "They wanted to prove that they were capable of doing it."
There was also the way the tanks were employed. Twenty-four tanks participated in the operation, and 11 were hit by anti-tank missiles. When the tanks began moving through the wadi, the Hizbullah fighters began firing missile after missile at the vulnerable armor. The men in the tanks asked for help, but because of the large number of Nahal infantrymen present, the Northern Command refrained from calling for assistance from artillery or helicopter gunships.
The committees set up by Peretz and IDF Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz will have to deal with these and other issues. Peretz has appointed former chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Amnon Lipkin-Shahak to head the investigation of the army's management of the war, and Halutz has asked former chief of staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Dan Shomron to act as liaison between approximately 10 internal IDF investigatory committees.
"There were many professional mistakes made in the use of the tanks," one officer said. "The soldiers were not trained properly for this battle and the division lacked experience in using tanks and infantry units operating together and in this type of terrain." |
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"There were many professional mistakes made in the use of the tanks," one officer said. "The soldiers were not trained properly for this battle and the division lacked experience in using tanks and infantry units operating together and in this type of terrain." Now that comment is surprising. So what have they been practising all these while for? A war with Romania? |
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Taiaha, all these while they were practising with stone-throwing Palestinians |
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Post time 26-8-2006 10:46 AM
Author
:ketuk:
