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Israeli Military Hardware (ex- Israeli Armour)
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mak aihh..keliling Anti RPG Cage |
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nih kat kawasan palestin ker...??? |
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Reply #153 spiderweb6969's post
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Hmmm would they develop a new MBT, or will they go foreign? |
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Originally posted by HangPC2 at 12-10-2006 08:23 AM
mak aihh..keliling Anti RPG Cage
psssttttttt..........ini lah oghang yg TAKUT MATI. :tq: |
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[B]Report: Missile system captured by Hizbullah, sent to Iran[/B]
SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM
Monday, November 6, 2006
TEL AVIV |
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Nov. 7, 2006 19:48 | Updated Nov. 8, 2006 0:21
Panel: 'Hanit' attack was preventable
By JOSH BRANNON
A panel of Navy officials that probed Hizbullah's radar-guided missile strike on the Hanit, one of the Navy's most sophisticated missile ships, reported on Tuesday that the attack - and the deaths of fours sailors - should have been thwarted.
The IDF's report on the incident, which was completed on Sunday and submitted to Chief of General Staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz Tuesday afternoon, read: "As far as the intelligence picture is concerned, it was found that despite the lack of pinpoint information about the weapon in the hands of Hizbullah, there was information in the Navy in the past that could have lead to some type of an assessment that the enemy possesses shore-to-ship missiles."
The investigative committee, led by Brig.-Gen. (res.) Nir Maor, found major flaws in the transfer of vital information from Military Intelligence to Naval Intelligence and to the commanders of the missile ships that patrolled off the coast of Beirut during the summer's war.
Navy officials told the committee that they did not know Hizbullah was in possession of advanced anti-ship radar-guided missiles. Military Intelligence said the information was given to the Navy in 2003.
According to the report, one Navy official, acting on a "gut feeling," raised the possibility that Hizbullah possessed Iranian missiles the morning of the attack, but was told by senior officers on the ship that such a threat was "imaginary and groundless."
In addition to the intelligence failures, the committee found a senior naval officer had deactivated the Barak missile defense system on the ship an hour before the attack without notifying the captain. The Barak system was capable of intercepting and destroying the missile.
The ship's command was caught so off-guard, that it did not know exactly what had happened until several hours after the missile strike, the committee found.
Navy Chief Maj.-Gen. David Ben Bashat said the report was a cause for concern and that inadequacies revealed by the committee were already being addressed. But Bashat insisted that the Navy's general assessment that there was not a missile threat accounted for the actions of the ship's commanders.
Bashat said instruments on two other ships patrolling the waters off Beiruit had identified the incoming missile, but had determined the object was Israeli air force jets returning from sorties over Lebanon.
Therefore, he concluded, the missile strike could not have been prevented, even if all the Hanit's instruments had been functioning at the time.
The report did not include recommendations for administrative action against any officers on the ship or in the Navy's upper echelons.
Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah commented on the attack in real-time on the second day of the war, warning Israel, "You wanted an all-out war, and that is what you will get. You don't know who you are dealing with," in a phone interview with a Lebanese television station.
Minutes later, television footage showed the missile being launched, and then striking the ship as Nasrallah remained on the phone. He coolly said, "A ship which was firing at the Shi'ite quarter of Beirut is on fire and is going to sink."
Four sailors were killed in the attack when the Iranian C-802 radar-guided missile struck near a helicopter pad on the Sa'ar 5-class missile ship. A fire broke out and the ship was significantly damaged, but was able to return to an Israeli port under its own power.
The missile was made in China, underwent upgrades in Iran, and from there was delivered to Hizbullah, military officials said.
The Hanit is Israel's most advanced missile ship and boasts an array of Harpoon and Barak antimissile missiles, along with a system for electronically jamming incoming missiles and other threats.
The committee had presented initial findings to Halutz on October 16 from its investigation into the July 14 missile attack on the Hanit. At the time, Navy sources said Halutz was not satisfied with the findings and asked that additional work be done.
Yaakov Katz contributed to this report. |
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[ Last edited by Nick_Perelman at 14-11-2006 02:30 PM ] |
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Six months after INS Spear attack:
Halutz reprimands five naval officers
By Amos Harel
Nearly six months since the outbreak of the second Lebanon war, Chief of Staff Dan Halutz took action yesterday against a number of officers involved in one of the more serious wartime failures - the strike on the INS Spear by an Iranian-made missile, in which four people were killed.
Halutz reprimanded two senior naval officers, with the rank of colonel, and three officers on the ship's crew.
Also yesterday, Halutz opened a two-day conference for the Israel Defense Forces' senior commanding officers. The conference, located at the air force base of Hatzor in the South, was held to discuss the findings of the in-house investigations into the army's wartime performance. At the end of the conference today, Halutz will present the main points of the IDF's plans for 2007, based on lessons learned in the war.
The attack on the INS Spear occured the night of July 14, when the ship was cruising off the coast of Beirut. A C-802 surface-to-sea missile struck the ship while it was nearly defenseless - because its missile defense systems had not been activated.
The missile struck a crane on the back of the ship. Had it hit a more sensitive part of the vessel, it could have sunk the ship and its crew of more than 80 officers and sailors.
The IDF-appointed inquiry committee, led by senior naval officer Brigadier General (res.) Nir Maor, concluded that the navy failed in not preparing for the case of Hezbollah using Iranian-made missiles against Israeli ships.
The naval command regarded such a scenario as "imaginary and exaggerated," even though it had been twice warned about this possibility. Three years ago, a Military Intelligence officer raised the possibility of such a scenario, and on the morning of July 14, a naval intelligence officer repeated the warning.
In addition, the investigation revealed serious misconduct in the handling of the ship during combat operations.
Based on the IDF probe's findings, Halutz lay overall responsibility for the incident on the naval command, headed by Major General Dudu Ben-Basat. However, he opted not to take any disciplinary steps against the commander of the navy.
Nonetheless, Halutz reprimanded two officers: the head of naval intelligence and the commander of the missile boats. The ship's captain was also reprimanded, and was informed his next posting would be in a staff position. The officers in charge of the engine room and the electronic warfare systems on the ship were also reprimanded.
Out of all the war investigations, this is only the second time measures have been taken against officers connected to failures. Regarding Hezbollah's abduction of the two reservists, the chief of staff approved the recommendations of the team headed by Major General (res.) Doron Almog to disqualify Division 91 commander Brigadier General Gal Hirsch and regional brigade commander Colonel Hen Livni from holding future field command positions.
In the first day of the conference yesterday, which lasted 12 hours, nearly 600 of the top IDF officers met to discuss the lessons of the war. Unlike previous meetings, those making the presentations were active commanders, not the reservist officers who led the investigation teams.
The only exception was the presentation by former chief of staff Dan Shomron, who led the probe into the General Staff's performance during the war.
"The essence of the probe is to learn, because we would like to improve our operational effectiveness and the IDF's preparedness for the missions and challenges that await us," Halutz said.
The following were mentioned among the lessons of the war: over-reliance on the Israel Air Force as a counter to Hezbollah; late call-up of reservist divisions; inability to solve the threat posed by short-range rockets; poor training and equipping of ground forces, particularly of reservist units; and failures in how decision making was made at the General Staff level.
Sources at the conference told Haaretz that in taking lessons from the war, Halutz is focusing on ways to prepare the IDF for future confrontations. They also stressed that the gathering was not presented as a setting for disagreements, and therefore many of those in attendance chose not to challenge the investigators' findings and the relatively minor measures taken against individual officers.
However, many of the senior officers believe the confidence crisis among the top brass is still strong, and that the coming months will test Halutz's ability to lead the army in reforms.
"A large segment of conference participants doubt the ability of the current leadership to lead," a major general on the General Staff told Haaretz. |
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lain macam bentuk merkava nih..??? |
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Reply #174 HangPC2's post
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Ni samada Mk III Baz atau Mk IV...memang lain..sebab add-on armor. |
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Originally posted by alphawolf at 3-1-2007 03:30 PM
Ni samada Mk III Baz atau Mk IV...memang lain..sebab add-on armor.
belajar dari kesilapan lepas ker nih...???? |
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Reply #172 Nick_Perelman's post
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Post time 11-10-2006 10:18 PM
