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VIEW: Lessons from Suharto 桭arish A Noor
Now that Suharto is gone, our focus turns to the military junta in Burma and their brutal suppression of their own people. Once again, ASEAN governments are turning a blind eye to what can only be a major diplomatic and regional crisis in the near future
The verdict of history is still not out yet following the demise of General-turned- President Suharto. For all his achievements in putting his country on the map and leading Indonesia towards industrial development, Suharto抯 human rights record remains one of the bloodiest in the post-colonial history of Southeast Asia, matched only by that of Ferdinand Marcos, who was likewise one of the great strongmen of Asia.
Suharto presided over one of the most spectacular socio-economic transformations in Asia of the 20th century: his nation of more than two hundred million souls was transformed over a period of three decades from a faltering post-colonial economy on the verge of bankruptcy into one of the most attractive destinations for foreign capital investment.
Yet the social and economic costs were high: Indonesia was sold as a source of cheap human labour and natural resources, to be exploited and plundered by foreign multinationals as never before. During this period, normal political activity in the country came to a standstill; political parties were either disbanded or forced to merge; political dissidents were routinely harassed, silence and incarcerated, with hundreds more liquidated at will by the armed forces and security agencies of the state. The Indonesian press was stifled; students told not to enter the arena of politics; feudal structures were reinforced while corruption was allowed to run rampant.
When he was deposed in May 1998, Suharto left office as one of the most corrupt leaders of the Third World, amassing wealth to the tune of billions of dollars that had been expatriated to foreign banks. Until today there is still no accounting of the exact extent and magnitude of his and his family抯 corruption, and their collusion with the forces of capital and the army that kept this entire system of patronage and state violence intact for so long.
There are, however, some important lessons to be learned from this complex and often painful |
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